


Tennessee

Partisan Fairness & Good Governance Plan

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Enacted Plan



Proposed Plan




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Introduction

Tennessee's newly enacted congressional map breaks from precedent in its treatment of Davidson County, the location of Nashville. In the previous map, TN-05 contained the entirety of Davidson County. The district was one of two democratic districts in the state, electing Jim Cooper (D) since 2003. This map, however, splits Davidson County between three districts: TN-05, 06, and 07. By cracking one of Tennessee's two heavily liberal counties, the enacted map shifts Tennessee from a map that consistently elects two democrats (and seven republicans) to a map that will only elect one.¹


This decision has been the subject of considerable controversy. First, the map is a republican gerrymander. By splitting Nashville and other parts of Davidson County, this map divides an important political community. These decisions also conflict with decades of historical congressional districts. Nashville and its suburbs, going as far back as 1973, have been placed in a single congressional district. Even in the status quo, with TN-05 a safe seat for democrats, Tennessee consistently underperforms its partisan lean, electing two democrats in a state with a partisan lean of R+14. With this cycle's change, the disparity becomes even more stark.

Second, the map cracks Nashville-area communities of color, pushing them into predominantly white districts. Accordingly, state democrats have levied claims that this map unfairly limits the voting power of voters of color. It's unclear whether these criticisms amount to a cognizable legal challenge, an issue to be discussed below. Amid these controversies, the Tennessee Democratic Party threatened to sue over the congressional map before it was signed

¹ TN-09 remains safe democrat district. Planscore indicates that the new TN-05 is competitive (strong lean republican). But with a partisan lean of R+10, it's unlikely that democrats will win this seat.


into law. While the group has initiated litigation over *state* legislative maps, it has not yet brought a challenge over the enacted congressional map.

Five-Thirty-Eight Partisan Analysis, Enacted



The 2010 map, and state democrat proposals in this redistricting cycle, resolve these concerns. These maps do not split Davidson, thereby preserving a second safe district for democrats.

Five-Thirty-Eight Partisan Analysis, 2010



Yet even these maps merely ensure that democrats, who constitute 38% of the electorate, elect just 22% of the state’s congressional representatives. In this paper, I explore methods for improving the representation of democrats. My proposed map produces one safe democrat seat, and another two potential democrat seats. The tension between maximizing democrat voting power and neutral redistricting principles is on full display. When in conflict, this map prioritizes neutral redistricting principles (minimizing county splits and forming compact districts) over democrat voting power.

However, I will illustrate alternative approaches to improving state democrat representation throughout. In the absence of traditional redistricting principles, it is possible to draft maps that produce stronger democrat seats. Ultimately, while Tennessee's partisan lean suggests that democrats should consistently win three to four seats, it's nearly impossible to produce such a map. It is, however, possible to produce one safe, and two lean, democrat districts.

Demographics, Partisanship, and Geography


Tennessee has a population of 6,910,840, of which roughly 5 million are citizens and of voting age. The state grew at 8.9% between 2010 and 2020, modestly outpacing the national rate of 7.4%. The number of Tennessee's congressional districts (9) is unchanged. The ideal congressional district population is 767,871.

Black Proportion of 18+ Population, by Voting District



Tennessee's citizen voting age is overwhelmingly white. The citizen voting age is 78.6% White, 16.7% Black, and 2.3% Hispanic. The black population is concentrated in southwestern Tennessee, particularly within Shelby County. Shelby County is 54.7% black, and accounts for roughly 40% of the state black population. Surrounding counties of Hardeman, Haywood, and Madison are all 35%+ black, but are small counties.


Black Proportion of 18+ Population, Shelby County



An appreciable black population also lives in Nashville, within Davidson County. Davidson County has a black CVAP of 28.1%, accounting for another 15% of the state's black


population. Outside of Davidson and Shelby Counties, very few counties have an appreciable black population.

Black Proportion of 18+ Population, Davidson County




Similar racial geography governs the distribution of non-white populations. Outside of Shelby County and Nashville, few counties have an appreciable number of non-white residents.

Non-White Proportion, by Voting District




Tennessee's democrats are similarly concentrated. The Cook Political Index suggests that the state has a prevailing partisan lean of R+14. Accordingly, democrats should win somewhere between three and four congressional seats. Yet the distribution of voters makes a fair map almost impossible to craft. 9 counties have a democrat vote share greater than 40%, 4 with over 55%, and only 2 with over 60%.

Biden Vote Share 2020, by County




Biden Vote Share 2020, by Voting District



Shelby and Davidson Counties have large democrat populations. The city of Chattanooga and Knoxville, while smaller, are also democrat strongholds


Shelby County, the home of Memphis, had a partisan lean of D+31 in 2020. This constituted more than 21% of Biden’s votes in the state. As discussed above, this county also has a high black population. It is traditionally home to a majority-black district.

Shelby County Biden Vote Share 2020, by Voting District



Davidson County, the home of Nashville, had a partisan lean of D+33 in 2020. This constituted another than 17% of Biden's votes in the state.

Davidson County Democratic Vote Share 2020, by Voting District



Legal Background

A. State Law

While state law curtails *state* legislative districts, no state laws govern Tennessee’s congressional reapportionment process.²

B. Federal Law

Given the lack of state reapportionment criteria, Tennessee’s redistricting process is solely governed by federal statutory and constitutional requirements. Federal constitutional provisions, stemming from the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment, require that districts be roughly equal population.³ Modest deviations are only permissible when pursuing other traditional districting principles, including respect for political subdivisions, or compact and contiguous districts.⁴ Generally, most maps produce minimal population deviation between districts. My proposed map satisfies this criterion, with a 2-person deviation between the largest and smallest district.

Similarly, when race is used as the predominant factor in crafting a district, the equal protection clause is presumptively triggered.⁵ Such districts are subject to strict scrutiny and can only be saved by a “compelling state interest” where the use of race is “narrowly tailored to that interest.”⁶ The Supreme Court has long assumed that compliance with the Voting Rights Act is a compelling state interest and has allowed compliant districts to stand.⁷ The Voting Rights Act compels the production of majority-minority districts when a racial minority group is 1)

² *Tennessee*; Princeton Gerrymandering Project (Apr. 2, 2022), <https://gerrymander.princeton.edu/reforms/TN>

³ *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)

⁴ *Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725 (1983)

⁵ *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)

⁶ *Id.* at 904

⁷ *Shaw v. Hunt*, 517 U.S. 899 (1996)

“sufficiently numerous and compact to form a majority in a single-member district,” 2) “politically cohesive,” and 3) the “majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”⁸ VRA districts must also have a history of discrimination that aligns with the Senate Report of 1982’s factors.⁹ As discussed below, I was mindful of VRA districts while crafting this plan.

Finally, partisan gerrymandering is not justiciable in federal court.¹⁰ Accordingly, Tennessee’s enacted map is not reviewable in federal court on the basis that republicans impermissibly diluted the votes of democrats.

⁸ *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986)

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Rucho v. Common Cause*, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019)


Plan Metrics

This plan succeeds in its goal. Planscore indicates that this map produces one safe district for democrats, one district with a democrat lean (D+4) and one district with a modest republican lean (R+2). This, of course, compares favorably to the enacted plan, which produces one safe seat for democrats, one strong lean republican seat (R+10), and seven safe republican seats. My proposed plan also has a far lower efficiency gap (7.1%) than the enacted plan (15.5%). In sum, my plan preserves democrat voting power, while the Tennessee plan needlessly dilutes it.

My proposed plan also performs well on traditional districting principles. This plan splits counties 11 times, the same number of splits as in the enacted plan. My plan is also considerably more compact than the enacted plan. Finally, while both have one majority-minority district, my plan produces an additional minority-influence district, where non-white residents account for a significant portion (30%) of voters.

There are, however, alternative plans that dilute the votes of democrats less than my proposed plan. I illustrate three such plans in this paper but reject each because they do not comport with traditional districting principles.


Discussion of Plan



Any map seeking to improve democrat seat share will need to address Shelby and Davidson Counties. Maps may also differ in how they deal with small liberal populations outside of those counties, including Chatanooga and Knoxville.

A. Shelby County (TN-09)


Proposed Shelby County Split



Shelby County has a population of 929,744 – 162,000 above the ideal district population. Accordingly, Shelby County must be split. This split is typically made along the East and West of the county. My map makes a similar split, with TN-09 taking the entirety of Memphis and expanding beyond city limits to capture black population in the North and East. The remaining population falls into TN-08.

Shelby County is a VRA district because it (likely) satisfies all *Gingles* factors. First, the black population of Memphis is “numerous and compact.” The county has 492,757 black residents – enough to constitute the majority in a congressional district. The population is also compact, clustering heavily in the southwest corner of the county (Memphis). In fact, the black population is so compact that my TN-09 captures 472,976 black residents – or 96% of the county’s black population.

Proportion of 18+ Black Population by Voting District, Shelby County




Second, the Memphis black population is likely politically cohesive. There appears to be a strong correlation between majority-black voting districts and majority democrat voting districts. While this data does not indicate that the Memphis black community votes for the same *primary* candidates, it does suggest that the community votes for similar candidates in the general. Further, that the black population is so compact, and is part of a general Memphis political group, lends further support to this assumption.

Third, surrounding white populations appear to vote ‘as a bloc’ and would thereby prevent the Memphis black population from electing their candidate of choice if not for a majority-black district. While a detailed breakdown of racial voting patterns is beyond the scope

of this paper, voting districts that are not majority-black tended to vote for Trump in the 2020 election. It is likely that, without a majority-black district, the black community would be unable to elect their candidate of choice. Whether Shelby County has a history of discrimination that satisfies the Senate Factors is beyond the scope of this paper.

Proportion of Biden Voters in 2020 by Voting District, Shelby County




My TN-09 succeeds in producing a majority-black district, with an NH Black CVAP of 63.2%. While this is slightly below the black population in 2010 (65.7%), it approximates the share of black voting population in the newly enacted plan (63.4%). The district is a safe seat for democrats under all plans. In the proposed map, the district has a predicted vote share of D+38 (Planscore). The new district will likely perform.

The proposed TN-09 has similar boundaries to the prior TN-09. Both maps place the entirety of TN-09 in Shelby County. The 2020 enacted plan, however, extends TN-09 North into Tipton County. Note that my TN-09 separates the Western-most appendage of Tipton County from the rest of TN-08, making it appear non-contiguous. Given that the 2010 map also split this appendage of Tipton County from the rest of TN-08, this is likely legal.


B. Davidson County (TN-04, TN-05)

Proposed Davidson County Split



As mentioned above, the enacted plan ignited controversy when it split Davidson County into three different congressional districts. Each district pulled liberal voters from Davidson, extending into surrounding conservative counties. This cracked democrats, creating two safe republican seats and one heavy lean (R+10) republican seat. This also diluted minority voters, dropping black voting populations to 10-17% of each district.


Davidson County, Enacted Plan



With a population of 715,884, Davidson does not need to be split to achieve target population. In fact, previous maps kept Davidson County (D+33 in 2020) whole. The resultant district was safe for democrats and had a non-white vote-share of roughly 35% (non-Hispanic black CVAP of 28%). It is impossible to produce a majority-black (or coalitional majority-minority) district in Davidson County, meaning that the district is not subject to a VRA challenge.

There are enough democrats in the region to construct two competitive districts. Given my goals of improving democrat seat share, I was faced with a trade-off: create a safe democrat district that avoided cracking minority populations or create two competitive districts. I chose to split Davidson County to produce competitive districts. TN-05 took the Northern half of Davidson County, accounting for 407,000 residents with a partisan lean of D+36 in 2020. TN-05 then expands North to reach target population. Surrounding counties are overwhelmingly republican, with partisan leans of R+45 (or higher) in 2020. Montgomery County, however, is large and is one of most moderate counties in the region, with a partisan lean of R+13 in 2020. By capturing Montgomery, TN-05 retains a modest lean for democrats, with a predicted vote share of D+4 (Planscore).

Proportion of Biden Voters in 2020, by Voting District




TN-04, for its part, retains the Southern tip of Davidson County (Nashville suburbs), with a population of 308,000 and a partisan lean of D+30 in 2020. To reach target population, TN-04 encompasses all of Rutherford and part of Williamson Counties. With a partisan lean of R+16 in 2020, Rutherford is the most liberal county adjoining Davidson. TN-04 then reaches target population by retrieving comparatively liberal voting districts in Williamson (R+20 in 2020). The resultant district has a predicted vote share of R+2 (Planscore).

Of course, the boundary between TN-04 and 05 will dictate the relative safety of this plan. There is an explicit trade-off between producing a safer democrat seat (TN-05) and a toss-up district (TN-04). By shifting the Davidson boundary North, TN-04 could become a D+0 district, but this would force TN-05 to a D+2 district. Conversely, shifting the boundary South could produce a safer TN-05 (D+6) at the expense of a less competitive TN-04 (R+4). My proposed boundary is not a definitive split between the districts.

As mentioned above, this decision effectively cracks minority-voters in Davidson County. Yet both districts retain non-white voting populations (27% and 30%) that are still likely to influence elections.


Proportion of Biden Voters in 2020, by Voting District



The above proposal is not the only way to maximize democrat vote-share. Other approaches produce stronger democrat districts in the Nashville region by accessing auxiliary democrats in other parts of the state. A non-exhaustive set of these approaches are illustrated


below. All perform poorly on traditional districting principles. However, these difficulties may not be fatal. Tennessee has, historically, not put much weight into traditional districting criteria. See, for example, Tennessee’s 2000 and 2010 congressional maps – which split many political subdivisions and are not compact. Nonetheless, I did not pursue any of these illustrations because my map puts stock in traditional districting principles.

Tennessee Congressional Map, 2000



Districts 07, 04, and 03 split many counties and are not compact


Tennessee Congressional Map, 2010



Districts 04, 03, and 02 split many counties and are not compact

i. Illustration 1: TN-04 to Knoxville

Illustration 1: TN-04 Expands to Knoxville




TN-04 (orange) expands East to capture a liberal population in Knoxville. N.B. this is an illustration, not a completed map

One way to improve democrat seat share is to expand TN-04 East to capture the city of Knoxville, in Knox County. Knoxville has a population of 190,000 and a partisan lean of D+15 in 2020. Excess democrats collected from Knoxville strengthens TN-04's liberal lean and allows TN-05 to shift South. Ultimately, both districts have a predicted vote share of D+6 (Planscore). This gives democrats a strong chance of securing three congressional seats.

Of course, this map clearly violates traditional redistricting principles. This new TN-04 splits nine counties in its pursuit of Knoxville and is not compact. While a clear partisan gerrymander, this plan may be constitutional under *Rucho v Common Cause*.

ii. Illustration 2: TN-04 to Chatanooga

Illustration 2: TN-04 Expands to Chattanooga




TN-04 (orange) expands South to capture a liberal population in Chattanooga. N.B. this is an illustration, not a completed map

TN-04 can also expand South to capture Chattanooga, in Hamilton County. Chattanooga has a population of 181,000 and a partisan lean of D+19 in 2020. As in illustration 1, TN-04's access to Chattanooga allows TN-05 to shift South, capturing more liberal voters. Ultimately, TN-05 achieves a predicted vote share of D+8 (Planscore). TN-04 retains a D+4 lean (Planscore).

As with illustration 1, this map violates traditional redistricting principles. TN-04 takes portions of Rutherford, Davidson, and Hamilton Counties. It also encompasses all of Cannon, Warren, Grundy, and Sequatchie Counties. The district is not compact, and nearly makes TN-03 non-contiguous. Nonetheless, the map may be constitutional.

iii. Illustration 3: Chatanooga to Knoxville

Illustration 3: Chattanooga to Knoxville District



A new district (orange) combines Chattanooga and Knoxville. N.B. this is an illustration, not a completed map

The above illustrations aim to bolster a 3-democrat map. But is it possible to produce a 4-democrat map? It is impossible to produce a third Nashville-area democrat district because Nashville does not have democrats to spare. Similarly, a second democrat district cannot be produced in Shelby County because splitting Shelby County would disrupt a majority-minority district, violating the VRA. The final possibility is combining Chattanooga and Knoxville. Yet such a district is not meaningfully competitive. The resultant district would still be a heavy republican leaning district, with an expected vote share of R+10 (Planscore). Nonetheless, democrats would have a (small) chance of flipping the seat, giving them a fourth district in Tennessee.

C. Rural Tennessee (TN-01, 02, 03, 06, 07, 08)

The remaining districts are all safe republican seats. Given republicans' natural geographic advantages in the state, these districts are safe republican seats no matter how I

apportioned them. I made no major partisan decisions while crafting these districts. However, I sought to build compact districts, avoided unnecessary county splits, and split as few people from the rest of their county as possible.

Conclusion

Tennessee's partisan geography makes it difficult to craft fair congressional maps. Democrats are naturally packed into Memphis and Nashville. Other liberal outposts are very far from either of these cities. Further, the VRA requires TN-09 to pack (minority) democrats into a district. While this is functionally helpful, preventing Tennessee's state legislature from making a 9-0 map, it ensures that plans naturally dilute democrat vote-power.


However, these difficulties do not make it impossible to produce maps that more adequately reflect the state's democrat voting base. In this paper, I sketch a plan that gives democrats the chance of winning three seats. While doing so would require democrats to trade-out a safe democrat district for two competitive districts, this is the only viable way for democrats to win a third seat. Other approaches to improve democrat vote share would require intense gerrymandering and violate traditional districting practices.

However, republicans have a tight grip on state politics, and appear bent on minimizing the political power of state democrats. These debates – about whether producing one safe, or two competitive, improves map fairness – may well be moot.


Appendix

Appendix 1: Detailed Plan Images


Proposed Plan




Proposed Shelby County



Proposed Davidson County



Proposed Plan v Enacted



Proposed Plan v 2010




Illustration 1




Illustration 2






Illustration 3




Appendix 2: Partisan Geography


Biden Vote Share 2020, by Voting District



Shelby County Biden Vote Share 2020, by Voting District



Davidson County Biden Vote Share 2020, by Voting District




Appendix 3: Racial Data


Black Proportion of 18+ Population, by Voting District




Non-White Proportion, by Voting District



Black Proportion of 18+ Population, Shelby County



Black Proportion of 18+ Population, Davidson County



Appendix 4: Compactness Report

Number of cut edges: 2,907

	Reock	Schwartzberg	Alternate Schwartzberg	Polsby- Popper	Population Polygon	Area/Convex Hull	Population Circle	Ehrenburg	Perimeter	Length-Width
Sum	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	3,818.44	N/A
Min	0.35	1.50	1.65	0.19	0.43	0.71	0.26	0.25	N/A	4.52
Max	0.58	2.07	2.31	0.37	0.95	0.90	0.84	0.58	N/A	90.05
Mean	0.46	1.75	1.96	0.27	0.80	0.81	0.62	0.41	N/A	35.98
Std. Dev.	0.09	0.19	0.22	0.06	0.15	0.06	0.19	0.12	N/A	29.59

Appendix 5: Political Subdivision Report

Number of subdivisions not split:

County	86
Voting District	1,954

Number of subdivisions split into more than one district:

County	9
Voting District	11

Number of splits involving no population:

County	0
Voting District	0

Split Counts

County

Cases where an area is split among 2 Districts: 7

Cases where an area is split among 3 Districts: 2

Voting District

Cases where an area is split among 2 Districts: 11

Appendix 6: Planscore Partisan Analysis

Proposed Plan, Partisan Analysis

District	Candidate Scenario	Pop. 2020	Hispanic CVAP 2019	Non-Hisp. Black CVAP 2019	Non-Hisp. Asian CVAP 2019	Non-Hisp. Native CVAP 2019	Chance of 1+ Flips [†]	Chance of Democratic Win	Predicted Vote Shares	Biden (D) 2020	Trump (R) 2020
1	Open Seat	767,871	1.4%	2.5%	0.5%	0.8%	No	<1%	27% D / 73% R	72,618	256,932
2	Open Seat	767,870	1.8%	6.5%	1.4%	0.8%	No	3%	39% D / 61% R	128,127	221,478
3	Open Seat	767,872	2.3%	10.7%	1.0%	0.9%	No	1%	35% D / 65% R	112,115	232,771
4	Open Seat	767,871	4.3%	18.6%	2.9%	0.6%	Yes	43%	49% D / 51% R	159,008	160,938
5	Open Seat	767,870	3.9%	22.4%	2.1%	0.8%	Yes	69%	52% D / 48% R	175,022	149,161
6	Open Seat	767,871	1.7%	4.1%	0.7%	0.9%	No	<1%	30% D / 70% R	87,063	260,052
7	Open Seat	767,871	2.1%	5.6%	0.8%	1.1%	No	<1%	31% D / 69% R	89,747	254,586
8	Open Seat	767,872	1.7%	18.7%	1.0%	0.6%	No	1%	33% D / 67% R	103,913	246,564
9	Open Seat	767,872	2.2%	63.2%	1.5%	0.4%	No	>99%	69% D / 31% R	216,103	69,990

Enacted Plan, Partisan Analysis

District	Candidate Scenario	Pop. 2020	Hispanic CVAP 2019	Non-Hisp. Black CVAP 2019	Non-Hisp. Asian CVAP 2019	Non-Hisp. Native CVAP 2019	Chance of 1+ Flips [†]	Chance of Democratic Win	Predicted Vote Shares	Biden (D) 2020	Trump (R) 2020
1	Open Seat	767,871	1.5%	2.5%	0.6%	0.8%	No	<1%	28% D / 72% R	74,135	256,542
2	Open Seat	767,871	1.9%	6.1%	1.3%	0.7%	No	2%	37% D / 63% R	122,696	226,797
3	Open Seat	767,871	2.1%	11.0%	1.0%	0.9%	No	2%	36% D / 64% R	115,372	226,462
4	Open Seat	767,872	2.9%	9.2%	1.4%	1.2%	No	2%	34% D / 66% R	98,032	220,486
5	Open Seat	767,871	3.3%	13.8%	2.4%	0.6%	Yes	18%	45% D / 55% R	157,616	198,795
6	Open Seat	767,871	2.1%	9.7%	0.9%	0.9%	No	3%	38% D / 62% R	120,187	221,697
7	Open Seat	767,871	3.6%	17.3%	1.7%	0.8%	No	13%	43% D / 57% R	135,627	185,336
8	Open Seat	767,871	1.6%	18.4%	1.1%	0.6%	No	2%	34% D / 66% R	110,205	244,396
9	Open Seat	767,871	2.3%	63.4%	1.4%	0.4%	No	>99%	68% D / 32% R	209,848	71,960

Appendix 7: Individual Districts

District: 01



Field	Value
District	01
Deviation	0
% D 20_Pres	22.0%
% R 20_Pres	78.0%
% NH White CVAP 19	94.6%
% NH Black CVAP 19	2.5%
% NH Asian CVAP 19	0.5%
% H CVAP 19	1.4%

District: 02



Field	Value
District	02
Deviation	-1
% D 20_Pres	36.7%
% R 20_Pres	63.3%
% NH White CVAP 19	89.3%
% NH Black CVAP 19	6.5%
% NH Asian CVAP 19	1.4%
% H CVAP 19	1.8%

District: 03




Field	Value
District	03
Deviation	1
% D 20_Pres	32.5%
% R 20_Pres	67.5%
% NH White CVAP 19	84.9%
% NH Black CVAP 19	10.7%
% NH Asian CVAP 19	1.0%
% H CVAP 19	2.3%

District: 04



Field	Value
District	04
Deviation	0
% D 20_Pres	49.7%
% R 20_Pres	50.3%
% NH White CVAP 19	73.2%
% NH Black CVAP 19	18.6%
% NH Asian CVAP 19	2.9%
% H CVAP 19	4.3%


District: 05



Field	Value
District	05
Deviation	-1
% D 20_Pres	54.0%
% R 20_Pres	46.0%
% NH White CVAP 19	70.3%
% NH Black CVAP 19	22.4%
% NH Asian CVAP 19	2.1%
% H CVAP 19	3.9%


District: 06

Field	Value
District	06
Deviation	0
% D 20_Pres	25.1%
% R 20_Pres	74.9%
% NH White CVAP 19	92.5%
% NH Black CVAP 19	4.1%
% NH Asian CVAP 19	0.7%
% H CVAP 19	1.7%



District: 07

Field	Value
District	07
Deviation	0
% D 20_Pres	26.1%
% R 20_Pres	73.9%
% NH White CVAP 19	90.2%
% NH Black CVAP 19	5.6%
% NH Asian CVAP 19	0.8%
% H CVAP 19	2.1%




District: 08



Field	Value
District	08
Deviation	1
% D 20_Pres	29.6%
% R 20_Pres	70.4%
% NH White CVAP 19	77.7%
% NH Black CVAP 19	18.7%
% NH Asian CVAP 19	1.0%
% H CVAP 19	1.7%

District: 09



Field	Value
District	09
Deviation	1
% D 20_Pres	75.5%
% R 20_Pres	24.5%
% NH White CVAP 19	32.4%
% NH Black CVAP 19	63.2%
% NH Asian CVAP 19	1.5%
% H CVAP 19	2.2%